Bergas Brillianto analyses the new St. Pauli head coach Alexander Blessin, previously one of Europe’s most extreme pressing coaches, and asks what the newly-promoted Bundesliga side will look like under him
In his inaugural press conference as St. Pauli’s new coach, Alexander Blessin dismissed comparisons to his predecessor, Fabian Hürzeler. Blessin said he is not Fabian Hürzeler 2.0. Interestingly, reports surfaced shortly before his appointment suggesting his team’s style, particularly at Union St-Gilloise, bore striking similarities to Hürzeler’s St. Pauli. In fact, these similarities were said to surpass those of other coaches linked to the St. Pauli job.
A closer look at Union St-Gilloise (USG) indeed reveals parallels. Blessin’s side employed a three-at-the-back system, often transitioning to a five-man defence out of possession. Their emphasis on build-up play from the back, especially against waekr sides, and their high-intensity style were reminiscent of Hürzeler’s St. Pauli. These similarities may explain sporting director Andreas Bornemann‘s decision to appoint Blessin.
However, Blessin is right to distance himself from the “Hürzeler 2.0” label. While the two coaches share a tactical foundation that has served St. Pauli well, their footballing philosophies diverge. Their build-up patterns and pressing strategies are very different. Using Analytics FC’s Coach ID service, we can see how Blessin’s USG team played with a high pressing intensity, but with a focus on deep circulation against weaker teams – this is the facet most shared with Hürzeler, but the latter was more patient, and less focussed on pressing and counterpressing, and more on retention.
Indeed, we can see that Blessin has been on a journey since his Genoa tenure. Blessin‘s Genoa were a very extreme high press, vertical side, while his USG team took aspects of that but focussed more on keeping the ball. Hürzeler is included on the style map for contrast – and it’s fair to say, St. Pauli will have some adaptation, unless Blessin continues to shift his approach in the same direction.
Assuming he doesn’t, though, the St. Pauli we see in the Bundesliga will undoubtedly be quite different from last season’s second-division champions.
The Build-Up and the Attack
Last season, Hürzeler showcased a versatile build-up approach. His preferred method was to tighten up his central defenders (CBs), Hauke Wahl and Karol Mets, while moving another CB, Eric Smith, into a number six role in-possession. The full-backs were instructed to tuck inside. The aim of this centralised approach was to control possession through Smith, who acted as the orchestrator. He could then either pass the ball to the full-backs to penetrate the half of the pitch, or go straight for the wide areas (where the wingers stay).
Hürzeler often sought to create numerical superiority in the centre of the pitch during build-ups, often using a 5-5 or 2-3-5 formation. This structure provided a solid foundation for possession, with five players contributing in their own half and five players remaining in the opposition’s half. However, when faced with an aggressive, man-marking press, he adapted his strategy.
He could sacrifice one of his attacking players (one of his number 8s, usually captain Jackson Irvine) to play Smith as another number 6. But this was not just to add another passing option, it was to create another pressing trigger. The logic was this: By dropping Irvine to help with the first phase of the build-up, it was hoped that he would attract opponents to follow him up the pitch, creating spaces that could be filled by the attacking unit (in this case, the full-backs).
In other cases, he could use his goalkeeper, Nikola Vasilj, to get more involved in the build-up. Vasilj would act as an extra CB. By using Vasilj, Hürzeler added another pressing trigger. This meant that if one of the opposing players jumped to press Vasilj, he would free someone to be the passing option. And by using Vasilj, Hürzeler could also add more players to his attacking unit (i.e. five in his own half, six in the opponent’s half).
Hürzeler is a big fan of the build-up under pressure. He likes to create triggers for the opposition to press, so that his team can have space somewhere, because the opponent has to move players in order to press. That’s why some analysts nicknamed him De Zerbian (as Roberto de Zerbi used the same approach to build his team). And to be honest, Blessin likes to do the same; he loves to bait his opponents into pressing his team’s build-up. But if Hürzeler’s style is more patient, Blessin’s is more direct and also has a different approach to it.
Unlike Hürzeler, who likes to position his CBs close together, Blessin prefers to position his CBs more widely. When he needs a narrow structure, it is his goalkeeper who jumps up and acts as an extra CB. This is also because Blessin doesn’t want his full-backs to be tucked in; he wants them to be wide and one of them to be up top. In the St Pauli context, Blessin still uses Smith as a number 6 during possession, but he also likes to use one of his midfielders (in St Pauli’s case, Irvine) to stay low during the build-up.
In general, Blessin likes to use four players during his first phase of build-up with not-really-narrow positions. With more players in the first phase of the build-up compared to Hürzeler’s, one might logically expect Blessin’s to be slower and more complex. But this isn’t the case. Blessin uses more players to induce the opposition to press, thus creating space and allowing for quicker ball movement. His approach is much more direct, characterised by frequent progressive passes.
Last season, for example, Blessin’s USG created a shot for every 23 passes completed per 90 minutes, beating Hürzeler’s St. Pauli, who needed 30. USG also averaged fewer touches in their defensive third (178.4) than St. Pauli (222.1). USG also made more progressive passes (48.7 per 90 minutes) compared to St. Pauli’s 45.1. Although not definitive, these statistics support the claim that Blessin’s style was more direct (as we have also seen at the beginning of this piece).
In the context of St. Pauli, Blessin benefits from Vasilj’s ability as a ball-playing goalkeeper who can act as an additional centre-back. In the friendly against Atalanta, Blessin used Vasilj as a decoy to trigger pressure from the opposition, freeing up a St. Pauli centre-back. Vasilj was then able to pass the ball to number six, who then played an additional pass to the free centre-back.
If that route is not available, Blessin opts for a direct pass to the forwards, using long ground balls rather than aerial attempts. The aim is for the strikers to act as ‘wall players’, maintaining possession, applying pressure, disrupting the opposition’s defensive structure and creating space for teammates. Ultimately, this strategy allows St. Pauli to move quickly into attack.
During the friendly against Atalanta, my partner asked me why Pauli often uses their full-back, especially Phillip Treu on the left, to attack out wide. I realised it was one of Blessin’s favourite ways of getting forward. His CBs would pass the ball to the full-back in the wide area and the full-back would play the ball forward with a lot of risky passes, play in the tight areas with constant movement and tight position, or try to pass the ball to the centre so the team could attack in the bigger space.
Blessin favours direct, progressive play with calculated risks. To maximise this style, he emphasises collective forward movement, filling all areas/corridors of the pitch (half-space, centre, flanks) and maintaining vertical compactness. This contrasts with Hürzeler’s approach, which at some points also focuses on horizontal movement in order to overcrowd certain areas during possession.
There are also differences in the personnel who occupy these channels. Under Hürzeler, the flanks were typically occupied by the wingers, the half-spaces by two number eights and the centre by the striker, as he favoured a 3-4-3 formation. By contrast, Blessin’s nominal 3-5-2 sees full-backs on the flanks, two number eights in the half-spaces and a striker partnership in the centre. Blessin’s aim is for his side to dominate these areas at all times, allowing for progressive play and attacks on goal. The closeness of his players in each channel is a testament to this.
This compact structure encourages short, sharp passing combinations rather than longer, more direct options such as crosses. Last season in the Belgian Pro League, Blessin’s USG averaged just two crosses into the box per 90 minutes, compared to 2.5 for Hürzeler’s St. Pauli. Similarly, Blessin’s side rarely changed the game with long balls, averaging just 1.8 switches per game compared to Hürzeler’s St. Pauli’s 3.79. Therefore for this season, St. Pauli fans can expect a more direct, high-tempo style of play, characterised by risky, short passing combinations and a focus on attacking play.
The Pressing and the Defence
This is where Blessin and Hürzeler diverge significantly. Last season demonstrated Hürzeler’s preference for a mid-block combined with medium-intensity pressing. His strategy was not to regain possession quickly but to channel opponent attacks into less dangerous areas, typically the flanks, to force turnovers. Hürzeler aimed to prevent opponents from building through their number six and encouraged them to play long balls.
Sometimes the current Brighton coach also employs intense man-to-man pressing, but only when he perceives the opponent to have a dangerous short build-up. The primary objective was not to consistently transform pressing into an attacking threat. This is reflected in St. Pauli’s statistics from last season. They created just 0.35 shots from defensive actions per 90 minutes and, according to Tim Eckstein’s article in the Millernton blog, had a PPDA (a metric measuring pressing intensity) of only 11.7. Additionally, St. Pauli made one tackle every 127 opponent touches in their defensive area per 90 minutes.
By comparison, USG had a PPDA of 9 last season (lower numbers indicate more aggressive pressure). They also created 0.63 shots per 90 minutes from defensive actions and made one tackle every 68 opponent touches in their defensive area. These figures illustrate Blessin’s desire for a more aggressive, high-pressing approach from the outset. He aims to disrupt the opponent’s build-up and convert these turnovers into chances. Last season, according to WhoScored, USG scored six goals from counter-attack situations (the second-highest in the league).
Blessin achieves this by using an overload or man-to-man approach, initiated from the goalkeeper’s distribution to the centre backs. Blessin’s players mark any potential passing opportunities for the opposition, forcing them to make mistakes. Blessin also makes use of the sideline by pushing the opposition wide, limiting their passing options and increasing the likelihood of mistakes.
Last season, Blessin’s USG forced a turnover every 64 touches, completed 81.3% of their short passes (second best in the league) and attempted just 35 through balls per 90 minutes (fourth best in the league). This strategy of reducing the opponent’s build-up and dangerous passes also benefits their defensive performance. USG conceded just 6.13 passes into their own box (best in the league) and only 0.64 expected assists (xA). As a result, they conceded just 27 expected goals all season (second best in the league).
Blessin’s side are aggressive even when their opponents are successful in getting the ball forward. His CBs often mark their opponents’ striker man-to-man, meaning that if the opponents’ striker tries to drop down to be a passing option, Blessin’s CB would jump to press and make sure that his marker does not turn his body towards their (Blessin’s) goal. By doing this, the Blessin players hope that the opponent will give the ball back to their defensive unit and the Blessin players can press them aggressively again in the opponent’s half.
St. Pauli fans will be expecting their team to play more aggressively in the Bundesliga this season. We have already seen this in the pre-season matches against Norwich and Atalanta, where St. Pauli scored after their opponents made poor passes that led to turnovers. It’s a way of creating chances that makes sense because, unlike in the 2. Bundesliga, St. Pauli won’t always be the ones controlling the ball, but rather the ones having to create chances from the transition or counter-attack situation.
The Questions and the Risks
There are still several questions to be answered for Blessin and St Pauli this Bundesliga season. Firstly, is the 3-5-2 formation the optimal system for the current squad? Andreas Bornemann has shown support for Blessin’s vision by signing striker Morgan Guilavogui. The Frenchman’s agility and aggression are assets both in and out of possession, making him a key player in this system.
However, squad depth remains an issue in attack. Maurides Junior, Andreas Albers, and Simon Zoller struggled to make a significant impact under Hürzeler last season, and this is unlikely to change. While injuries and off-field problems have played a part, the underlying quality is the main concern. Wingers like Elias Saad and Oladapo Afolayan excelled in Hürzeler’s system but may have limited roles under Blessin.
Blessin has acknowledged the need for flexibility, suggesting a switch to 3-4-3 would be possible at some point to accommodate the wingers. Saad and Afolayan could potentially play as central strikers, filling the roles vacated by Guilavogui or Johannes Eggestein, but this may not be the ideal solution for everyone. The future of the wingers in this system remains uncertain. Acquiring a fast centre-back capable of covering width could be a solution, allowing a winger to operate as a wing-back, similar to Koki Machida’s role at USG, where he supported left wing-back Loic Lapoussin to play more forward.
In my opinion, St. Pauli indeed needs a quicker CB. Their main trio of Mets, Smith and Wahl are very good on the ball, but their lack of pace could be a disadvantage in transition situations. As I mentioned above, Blessin often wants his CBs to press the opposition aggressively, so they jump and leave space for the opposition to attack. But if they don’t jump, that means there’s a lot of space between the attacking and defending units, and space means risk. And risks mean problems.
[Hauke Wahl jumped to press the opponent and created space]
Matches against Atalanta and Hallescher FC highlighted these defensive vulnerabilities. When pressing is not coordinated, opponents can exploit gaps between the lines. Blessin’s preference for pressing on the flanks can be countered by quick switches of play, creating overloads and exposing defensive weaknesses. The team’s numerical disadvantage in attack, with six players forward, exacerbates these issues when possession is lost. These problems were evident at USG, so not new for Blessin.
Also, because Blessin likes his players to move forward together when the ball is in possession, and because the attacking unit has 6 players, this means that his team often faces problems if the opponent succeeds in disrupting the build-up. This is because Blessin’s team is already outnumbered by the opposition, or at least on a par with them numerically. So with more space to cover, the risks and problems were greater. And all of these problems were present during his time at USG, not just at St. Pauli.
In the Bundesliga next season, when they’ll face a lot of teams with very good attacking quality – with a lot of fast, very good individual quality players – St. Pauli could have a lot of problems if the pressing, defensive, and positional approach isn’t solved by Blessin (assuming they wouldn’t buy any more players, especially for defence). In fact, St. Pauli has become more risky than before, both in and out of possession. The chances of being safer defensively than before have decreased.
Not to mention the chances of exhaustion from playing at a higher intensity throughout the season. St Pauli midfielder Connor Metcalfe has already said that training under Blessin is more intense than before. During the friendly against Atalanta, I saw a lot of players looking exhausted. Last season, Blessin’s USG showed a decline in form in the Championship play-offs after an excellent regular season (70 points from 30 games). So, fatigue could be something everyone expected for this season.
Header image copyright IMAGO / Philipp Szyza
